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The Timaeus on Types of Duration
T. M. ROBINSON
This paper casts another glance at a number of questions in the
realm of cosmo-theology that have divided students of the Timaeus
since the time it was written. Did Plato clearly distinguish, in this
dialogue, the concepts of eternity, sempiternity, and everlastingness?
If he did, with what sort of duration did he credit the Demiurge,
World Soul, the Forms, and the physical universe? What relationship
does the answer to the first question have to assertions, in such
dialogues as the Laws, that "soul" is both autokinetic and the source
of the motion of other things? And finally, why did Plato's unique
description of the eternal (as the "perpetuous" or "abeternal,"
Siaiobi/tot;) apparently fail to interest, except peripherally, the post-
platonic tradition?
I start from a partial statement of the problem in Cornford (p.
98, n.I): even at 37d, he says, "where [Plato] is contrasting eternal
duration {aiuiv) with everlastingness in time, [he] will not reserve
aiiovioq for "eternal" and ocibLoc, for "everlasting." aibioc, is applied
both to the model and to the everlasting gods." This apparent
conceptual sloppiness disturbs Cornford, who at 37d7 is tempted to
conjecture aevaov ("ever-flowing") for aidvLov. But this seems unnec-
essary: a willingness to use synonyms is no indication of an author's
conceptual confusion, and in fact a careful examination of Plato's
usage of these terms in conjunction with others shows, I think
conclusively, that he has in the Timaeus a clear and precise cosmo-
theology to express.
Let us begin with the supposed terminological inexactitude that
revolves round three adjectives: a.ibi,oc„ aiooPLoq, and dLai6)VL0c,. The
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first, a word going back to Homer and meaning "ceaseless," "without
end," is applied to the eternal duration of the specific Form dubbed
by Plato "Eternal Living Creature" and of the Form-world generally,
and to the unceasing duration, once they are formed, of the gods.
The second, meaning literally something like "age-long," is applied
to the duration of the same Eternal Living Creature and, if the
manuscripts do not deceive us, to the unceasing duration of the
universe once formed. The third is applied specifically and solely to
the Eternal Living Creature. Which term Plato is likely to use will
turn, one may conjecture, on perspective: when he wishes to stress
the unceasing nature of the Forms or the gods, the time-honored
word aidioq will serve the purpose adequately, being equally applicable
to both. When he wishes to emphasize the immensity of the duration,
numerical and non-numerical, of the formed universe and its para-
digm respectively, an appropriate term at his disposal is aL<jovLoq, a
word he may actually have invented for the purpose; apart from its
use here, and in a joking reference to aicovLoq nedrj at Rep. 363d2,
the first known use of the term in extant Greek writing is in the
writings of Plato's contemporary, Demosthenes (1. 13, 1. 19). When
he wishes to emphasize the "eternity," in the most exact sense, of the
formed universe's paradigm he applies what is undoubtedly a coinage
of his own, diaLWULoq, which one might translate, to catch the tone of
its initial strangeness, "perpetuous" or "abeternal"; the force of the
dia seems to be that the paradigm iravTa aiOiva Ictlv 6v (38c 1-2), in
the sense that its duration is for eternity as a plenitude, the force of
the (tenseless) Iotlv ov that the paradigm's duration is non-temporal.
The noun that parallels Siaiojj/ioq, "perpetuity" (= "eternity"), it
should be added, is for Plato aioiv (37d6, 38c2, etc.), a bold piece of
transference of a word which till that date had been understood by
most if not all Greeks as meaning something like "a very great length
ofti)fie." It is, like dLatcovLoq, a term he frequently, though not invariably,
uses as his word for eternity in the strictest sense.
In addition to the above terms, Plato has and makes use of other,
remarkably exact and consistent terminology for the concepts of
eternity, sempiternity and everlastingness. First, in talking of what he
thinks of as eternal in the genuine sense, i.e., in talking of the Forms,
the Demiurge, and Space (x^opa), he is careful to use either the
"tenseless" eari alone (37e5, of "eternal being"), or the tenseless
etvai with aet (27d6, of the world of Forms: 52a8, of Space: 34a8,
of the Demiurge), or the participial noun derived from etVai with
a€i (50c5, of the Forms of the four "natural kinds"). Eternity itself,
ai6:v, he describes as "abiding in unity" n'evovroc, iv hi (37d6), by
contrast with that which is subject to numerical progression.
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In the very strictest sense, only the Forms appear to be thought
of by Plato as eternal, since no manner of KLvqaiq can be attributed
to them. Hence the ascription to Forms, and to Forms alone, of the
term dtaLWPioq. The Demiurge, by contrast, is subject to at least the
KLvrioLq of thought and emotion, and in general of intellectual/moral
"process"— a KiurjaLq which is in fact avTOKturjcnc,,^ and the only exact
instance thereof in the dialogue, that Plato will describe elsewhere
as the condition of in fact all ypvxr)- Space, too, in eternal motion, is
forever moving and being subjected to (further) motion by that which
it contains (52e3-4). On these grounds Plato can use language of
the Demiurge which suggests both the changelessness of eternity and
"process"; while he is subject to the Kivqcnq of thought and emotion,
such that he can "intervene" to form the world, he nonetheless
(42e5-6) "continued to abide by the wont of his own nature" {eiieveu
h TO) eavToi) Kara Tpbirov rjOei: tr. Cornford). (Cf. 37d6, where Eternity
is described as nevovroq ev evi). Likewise Space, while still being dubbed
eternal, has a structure and manner of existence so different from
that of the Forms that it can only be ascertained by at best a "bastard
form of reasoning" (52b2).
When Plato wishes to speak of "everlastingness" (i.e., duration
without end but with a beginning in time and measurable by tirtie)^
he will still talk of "abiding" (ixevetu), but of abiding forever (ati) (the
astral gods are so described at 40b6), or of being "in motion forever"
(at 58c3 he talks of ij ael Kivrjaic; of the four primary bodies). The
crucial verb etuat., which would with aei have signalled eternity rather
than everlastingness, is conspicuously and to my mind studiously
avoided.
' See below, p. 149. Efforts by many to "collapse" Demiurge and World Soul (or
Demiurge and the uovq within World Soul) founder on this point. The entire description
of World Soul in the Timaeus emphasizes its dependence— whether in time or ab
aeterno; the argument is unaffected—on something other than itself. The Forms
moreover are portrayed as wholly paradigmatic; there is no hint of any supposed
role for them that might be understood as one of efficient causality. (Compare in an
earlier dialogue the Form of the Good, which, says Socrates, "produced" the sun.)
This can only mean that the Demiurge himself is expected to be seen as what he
purports to be— the formed world's efficient cause, including that of its soul. If he
is meant further to be understood as a personal divinity (and nothing in the text
suggests convincingly that he is not; the "account" is described as "likely," not
"unlikely"), then his soul, and his alone, can be said to possess the non-dependent
autokinesis that Plato will eventually extend to all rational soul in the Phaedrus and
to all soul as such in the Laws.
- By contrast with a stance adopted in an earlier article (see below, note 5), I
prefer now to talk for clarity's sake of "everlastingness," rather than of "sempiternity"
in some secondary sense of the word.
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For the sempiternal as such Plato does not have an exact term.
There are, however, it seems, four necessary conditions for the
ascription of sempiternity to X: these are (a) that X be a potential
object of perception; (b) that it be, from a beginningless past to an
endless future, dependent upon an entity that is itself eternal; (c) that
it be in a state of beginningless and endless motion; (d) that it possess
a form of duration not measured, except incidentally, by time. Space,
for example, is eternal (albeit in some less strict sense of the term:
see above) rather than sempiternal; it is in no way dependent on
anything else for its existence, and it is the object, not of perception,
but of (bastard) reasoning. The "traces" (Ix^rj) of the Forms that are
"in" Space are, by contrast, sempiternal, being (a) "visible" {opara,
30a3); (b) in beginningless and endless motion; (c) ceaselessly de-
pendent upon Space as a condition both of their activity and, in some
measure, of the quality of that activity; and (d) unmeasured by time,
except in the incidental instance of their ever being constituted, by
an external agent, into formed bodies. The dependence relationship
between the traces of matter and Space is further reinforced by
Plato's asseveration that it is the "nature" of the Wandering Cause
to "sustain (sc, in motion)" (0epeiy, 48a6-7).^
Strategic uses of verbs such as etvaL, n'evtiv and (i)epuv, with the
addition, where necessary, of the adverb aei, are in effect "fail-safe"
techniques adopted by Plato to guide the reader to his exact intentions
when more time-honored terminology alone might perhaps have
confused. At 40b6, for example, when discussing the manner of
duration of the astral gods, he uses the term atSioq, an adjective we
have already noticed him applying to the Form-world generally and
the archetypal Form Eternal Living Creature in particular. That it is
the gods' everlastingness that is in question, however, not eternity is,
as we have seen, made clear in the very same sentence when he talks
of their fievetv ad not their ttvai ad. At 37e4-6, by contrast, where
the manner of duration of Forms such as Eternal Living Creature is
described as aidioq, the case for the meaning "eternal" in duration,
as distinct from sempiternal or everlasting, seems clinched by Plato's
' Cf. [PI.] Epin. 983b, where Cornford, following Harward and followed by Taran,
translates </)€p€ij' as "set in motion," and Tim. 43a7, where he translates 0ia t<t>epouTo
Koi e<t)(poi> as "cause and suffer violent motions." But this places an intolerable strain
upon the verb 4>iptiv, whose natural sense is "support" (of a pedestal bearing a statue)
or "carry" (of a ship carrying a passenger). At Tim. 48a6-7 and Epin. 983b it is
probably best construed in terms of sustention, in the first case the sustention of
basic matter by the Errant Cause, in the second the sustention of all living things by
Bibc,. (See LSJ-', s.v., Al). At Tim. 43a7 the sense is surely that soul-circles both "carry
(along)" and are to their detriment "carried (along) by" the body and its movements.
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immediate statement, in the very next sentence, that he means by
the term aidioq that (and only that?) sort of existence to which to
eoTiu ixbvov Kara tou aXrjdri Xoyov Tvpoai^Ku. A little earlier, at 37d7,
he had talked of the formed universe as an aioivwv eUbva of eternity,
an adjective Cornford found so inappropriate (see above, p. 143)
that he was tempted to conjecture aevaou, as in Laius 966e. 1 have
already suggested, in terms of the immensity and perhaps awesome
duration of the universe and its paradigm, one possible reason why
Plato used the adjective aidLoq here, in spite of 2Lny primafacie confusion
it could have generated. However that may be, the status of the
formed world's duration as everlasting, not sempiternal or eternal,
whatever Plato's choice of adjective for it, is demonstrated by the
subsequent reference to it as that to which to ^v to t' fVrat . . . Trperei
XiyicBai (38al-2).
Fail-safe techniques of this type are, of course, unnecessary when
Plato's exact, technical terminology— aloiv, dLaio^vLoc,— is in question.
They signify, univocally, (a) "perpetuity" (= "eternity"), the manner
of duration of the Form-world in general and the formed universe's
paradigm in particular, and (b) "perpetuous," the noun's neologistic
adjectival counterpart.
Whether Plato believed, when he wrote the Timaeus, that the
world and its guiding Soul were sempiternal, rather than everlasting,
as many have thought, seems to me very doubtful. Here, as before,
Plato has what looks like a fail-safe technique to direct the reader to
his precise intention. This consists in the exercise of remarkable
carefulness in the use of the mood and tense of verbs, not least in
those contexts where he might be thought to be offering hints that
the dialogue is to be read figuratively rather then literally. At 37b5,
for example, the world is described as to KLvovjxtvov u0' avTov, and
scholars have been quick to find here a reference to the uncaused,
self-moving soul of Phaedrus 245c, the clear inference being that the
world and its soul are sempiternal, not, as the surface-interpretation
of much of the Timaeus might suggest, everlasting entities. But the
equivocity of the term "self-moving" is apparent in Cornford's own
description (note ad lac.) of "the heaven as a whole, which, as a living
creature, is self-moved by its own self-moving soul"; in what sense,
except some trivial one, is X self-moving if its supposed self-motion
is dependent upon the (real or supposed) self-motion of Y? As it
happens, Plato goes on (37c6-7) to make it clear that the Phaedrus
doctrine of soul is not in question when he says, "When the father
who had begotten it (sc, the world) saw it set in motion {Kivyjdev) and
alive," etc. (the mood and tense are significant); the "autokinesis" of
the formed universe is revealed, for anyone who had ever doubted
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his meaning, as analogous in all important respects merely to the
commonplace, non-technical type of self-motion Plato attributes to
any animal as distinct from any plant (77c4-5)— that is, it is dependent
self-motion (i.e., in the strictest sense not self-motion at all), and had
a beginning in time.
A second supposed hint of a doctrine of the sempiternity of the
world in the Timaeus is to be found at 30a3, where the pre-cosmos
is described as irav ooov rju bparbv. Since the organized cosmos had
already been called (28b 7-8) opaToq . . . airTOc, t€ . . . /cat acina exo^v,
some have inferred that talk of a pre-cosmos is clearly to be taken
as figurative only. No fail-safe technique, however, on Plato's part is
needed this time to see that the two descriptions are totally different,
in spite of the use of the common word "visible." The formed world
is composed of specified objects, and has bulk {awixa); that is why it
is both bparbq and airToc,. The pre-cosmos possesses merely "traces"
of reality. A strong hint of what Plato meant in nonetheless calling
it bparbq, despite the fact that it did not consist of formed objects, is
to be found at Phaedo 79a6 ff., where aiS^q seems to be a Platonic
synonym for "non-physical" or "non-corporeal." The pre-cosmos,
however, while not corporeal (it possesses no formed aojjLiaTQ; within
it), is not wholly incorporeal either; it is apparently something like
one of the ghosts Socrates describes at Phaedo 81c4, creatures hovering
somewhere between materiality and immateriality, but not graspable
{a-KTo) because they do not consist of formed bodies (aco/iara).
A third "hint" at 28a 1, where according to the Oxford text the
Forms are contrasted with a world described as yiyvbuevov ad turns
out to be illusory. Quite apart from the dubiousness of the manuscript
evidence and ancient secondary evidence for aet,^ parallel texts in
the Timaeus itself, where ad is conspicuously absent, make it clear
that Plato is attempting to contrast Forms, which do not have a
yeueaiq, with material objects, which do.^
One final point. On the far from obvious assumption that the
Phaedrus ante-dates the Timaeus, many have inferred that all KLvrjaiq,
whether the Timaeus is read literally or figuratively, must have as its
source some form of rpvxv^ since at Phaedrus 245c \pvxv is said to be
the self-moving source of all Kivrjcnq. This has led to various claims,
ranging from the existence of an Irrational World Soul behind the
motions of pre-matter (Plutarch) to an irrational element in World
Soul that is never fully mastered by rationality (Cornford). But Plato
himself offers an account, in the pages of the Timaeus itself, that
' See John Whittaker, Phoenix 23 (1969), 181-82 and ibid., 27 (1973), 387-88).
' See Tim. 37b2-3, 48e6-49al, and T M. Robinson, Phronesis 24 (1979), 105-109.
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suggests much more precisely what his thinking is. At 57e ff. we
read:
Motion will never exist in a state of homogeneity. For it is difficult,
or rather impossible, that what is to be moved should exist without
that which is to move it, or what is to cause motion {to Kivriaov) without
that which is to be moved by it. In the absence of either, motion
cannot exist; and they cannot possibly be homogeneous. Accordingly,
we must always presume rest in a state of homogeneity, and attribute
motion to a state of heterogeneity {avoipLaXbrr}Ta). Further, inequality
(awffOTT/q) is a cause of heterogeneity, and the origin of inequality we
have already described, (tr Cornford)
While for an instant the reader may imagine that the Kivriaov
mentioned here will be an existent of some sort— like, say, \l/vxr]—
the subsequent references, in the same passage, to aviaoTrjq and
avwuaXoTTjq make it clear that Plato is referring to particular conditions
under which, according to the passage in question, the "primary
bodies" operate. As it happens, exactly the same conditions obtain,
as Cornford sees (p. 240), for the movements in Space of the dvvaneic,
of the pre-cosmos, which are described (52e2-4) as "neither alike
nor evenly balanced" {nrjd' onoicov . . . /u^re iaoppbiToov), as having "no
equipoise within any region of it" {kut' ovbtv avrriq laoppoTreiv), and
as being "everywhere swayed unevenly" (avu^fiaXooq iravTrj raXavrov-
nhr]v). The natural conclusion to be drawn from this can only be
that, just as the eternal equipoise of a given Form (or of the World
of Forms as a whole) is the basis of its/their eternally unchanging
state, the sempiternal lack of such equipoise among the dvvafieLq of
pre-matter accounts for their sempiternal KLvr]OLq; no further doctrine
of a supposed presence of i/'ux'? need be imported.
I conclude from the above that for the Plato of the Timaeus the
Forms, God, and Space are eternal, the Forms in the most basic sense
and God and Space in another, logically difFerentiable sense involving
KLvqaiq, if only in God's case the Kivr](XLq involved in thought and
volition. The ixi'V or Urstoff that characterize Space are by contrast
sempiternal, and the formed world, including its soul, everlasting. It
is a scenario he sees only as "likely"; he is in no way bound by it,
and will in later dialogues, notably the Philebus and Laws, make
significant modifications to it. But that is another essay. For the
moment I wish to turn briefly to the post-platonic tradition and ask
what happened to some of the key transformations and neologisms
we have noticed in the Timaeus, particularly that of the "perpetuous."
The first thing that can be said is that the use of aiC^v to mean (in
certain contexts) "eternity" is largely accepted by subsequent philos-
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ophy; this group includes not only Aristotle (passim), Philo (1. 496,
619), and Plotinus (3. 7. 5), it also encompasses Epicurus (Sent. 20),
much exercised to allay "fears concerning eternity." The same goes
for the cognate adjective aioovioq and adverb aiuiuiox;, though a growing
commitment to a much more technical philosophical vocabulary is
very apparent. One notable exception is however Aristotle. The
omission of both words throughout the Corpus is striking, and can
hardly have been accidental. One can only assume that for Aristotle
the new terminology was superfluous; he himself is content to rely
on context and the time-honored Homeric word aidLoc, to describe
both the eternal life of God (Metaph. 1072''29) and the sempiternal
duration of the cosmos.^ The neo-platonic tradition, by contrast, sees
virtue in Plato's terminology. In a well-known passage Plotinus care-
fully distinguishes the "eternal" (aiwuLoc;) from the "sempiternal"
(aidLoq), and Proclus (Inst. 172) has the same commitments when he
writes of vovc, as being aKivrjToc, ai(j^vi(jo<; irapra oiv."^ They differ from
Plato in that the language is now truly technical; no fail-safe techniques
are needed to guard against possible misinterpretation. Their case is
aided by the relative simplicity of their own cosmology vis-a-vis Plato's;
once the doctrine of a pre-cosmos is discarded (as it was within a
generation of Plato by Xenocrates, if not by others), the notion of
temporal everlastingness, which only made sense in terms of such a
doctrine, can also be quietly jettisoned, leaving simply the notions of
the eternal (time-transcendent) and the sempiternal (time-measured).
With these two concepts now finally clarified, the concept of the
biaiicvLov can also be discarded as at best a superfluous synonym for
the aioiviov, dreamed up by Plato to cover his own failure to make
appropriate distinctions between the terms aiCivioc, and otibLoq. That
is, of course, to state the case most strongly; in practice, pietas toward
the master was such that a word like bLaiwvioc, was unlikely to be
abandoned in so unfeeling a manner. We find it used, for example,
o^ ivbaLnovia in Philo (2. 569), in Philodemus {de piet. 80), and nearer
the end of classical antiquity, in the Emperor Julian {Or. 4. 144c);
Philodemus also used it of "living creatures" {de piet. 111). Philo in
particular finds the word to his liking— so much so that he coins the
verb bLaLii)vi^€Lv (a coinage which, perhaps because Philo is not Plato,
enjoys a brief day of glory in his own works and is never heard of
again). It is only in the fifth century that Proclus (Theol. Plat. 5. 37)
and Syrianus {in Metaph. 103. 28) return to the use of the word in
the way that Plato had originally planned—and then in its adverbial
® For references see Bekker s.v.
^ See also SimpHc. in Epictet., p. 77D.
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form only. Even at this stage it still appears to be little more than
complimentary and complementary; its value is at best that of emphatic
synonym.
It is worth emphasizing that the distinctions with which Plato
wrestled in the Timaeus constitute one of the history of philosophy's
success-stories, not one of its failures. On the debit side, to be sure,
from Plato's point of view, lies the fact that his doctrine of the
everlastingness (measured in time) of the formed cosmos was largely
rejected, albeit by the rough technique of denying that he ever
espoused any notion of the world's temporal formation in the first
place. Parasitic upon this was the large-scale rejection of the notion
of the sempiternal as the non-temporal or perhaps extra-temporal
mode of duration that Plato considered to be a characteristic of the
world's pre-matter; the sempiternity of (formed) matter is understood,
from Aristotle onwards, as being unequivocally in the temporal mode,
though without beginning or end. On the credit side, the seminal
nature of Plato's discussion is such that the relationship of eternity
to sempiternity does in fact finally get clarified, and three of the four
basic neologisms and verbal transformations he employed to meet
the problem, aioiv, aibLoq and aioiiVLoq, have become, along with other
major Platonic coinages such as the notion of -KOLbT-nc,, part and pafcel
of subsequent Greek thinking, and in various translations part and
parcel of the western heritage.
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